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Abstract 
This paper proposes a public key based management scheme for secure sensor network operation 
namely S-PkSec (Public Key Based Security for Sensor Networks) and emphasizes detailed 
comparison with some similar type of schemes. Although there was a wide held belief of the 
incompatibility of public key cryptographic (PKC) schemes for wireless sensor networks (WSNs), 
some recent works have shown that, PKC or asymmetric key based schemes could be implemented for 
such networks in some ways. The major challenge of employing a PKC scheme in sensor network is 
posed by the limitations of resources of the tiny sensors. Considering this feature of the sensors, we 
enhance our previous work [1] with some effective comparisons and energy analysis with other two 
established asymmetric key based protocols. S-PkSec comprises basically of two parts; a key 
handshaking scheme based on simple linear operations and the derivation of decryption key by a 
receiver node. S-PkSec allows both base-station-to-node or node-to-base-station secure 
communications, and node-to-node secure communications. Analysis and simulation results show that, 
our proposed architecture ensures a good level of security for communications in the network and 
could effectively be implemented using the limited computation, memory and energy budgets of the 
current generation sensor nodes.  
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1. Introduction 
  Security is often viewed as a standalone component of 
many systems’ architectures. But, in case of wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs), security is more than an 
important issue that must get commensurate emphasis. The 
types of services expected from wireless sensor networks 
often make security as the most important concern for 
deploying and using such types of networks. In many 
cases, the tiny sensors in a sensor network are used to 
collect specific data from particular target areas and the 
collected data are often considered secret and not to be 
disclosed in public. Hence, efficient and secure 
mechanisms are needed to transmit acquired data secretly 
to the appropriate recipients. 
Sometimes wireless sensor networks carry confidential 
information which if exposed to the adverse units, might 
cause debacle for the friendly units. Especially in military 
applications of WSN, employing apropos security 
mechanisms for data transmissions is very crucial as these 
data could be used for taking tactical military decisions. If 
an adversary can thwart the work of the network by 
perturbing the information produced, stopping production, 
or pilfering information, then the usefulness of sensor 
networks is drastically curtailed. Likewise, for example in 
a disaster management related application, accurate and 
unmodified data are needed to predict upcoming 
disaster(s) and to warn the concerned people in advance 
about the occurrence of event(s).  
Ensuring complete and a good level of security for such 
a type of networks however, is not a trivial task. As these 
sorts of networks use wireless communications, the threats 
and attacks against WSNs are more diverse and often large 
in scale. It is not possible to deal with all sorts of security 
threats with a single mechanism. Rather, a combination of 
different security schemes for a single network could be 
the solution. For example, an attack at the physical layer 
like, jamming [2] could not be handled by any key 
management scheme. Hence, several mechanisms at 
different layers could be employed at the same time to 
provide holistic security [3] for wireless sensor networks 
and side by side the level of security in the data 
transmission and communication phase could be increased 
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using efficient key management schemes. Public key 
cryptography (PKC) could be the best choice for ensuring 
a satisfactory level of security for data transmissions 
within the network. However, the major challenge of 
employing a public key security scheme directly in 
wireless sensor network is the constrained energy, 
computation, and memory budgets of sensors participating 
in the network. Among several public key schemes, 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based algorithms have 
a proven and acceptable performance for low-powered 
sensor nodes [4], [5], [6]. Considering both the software 
and hardware configurations, elliptical curve based public 
key cryptography (PKC) has shown relatively better 
results on 8 bit mote platforms. However, the use of 
certificates in such a scheme consumes a huge amount of 
bandwidth and power.  
Considering the special characteristics of wireless 
sensor networks, in this paper, we propose an efficient 
public key/asymmetric key based security scheme (S-
PkSec) for WSN. Here S stands for Secure, Scalable 
Sensor network. In our scheme, we use pseudoinverse 
matrix for the first part while the second part is a simple 
method for transferring decryption key to the receiver 
node. Our analysis and simulation results show that our 
scheme demonstrates a considerable gain in the level of 
security and is suitable enough to be employed with the 
current generation sensor nodes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the literature review, Section 3 states the 
preliminaries and assumptions for our security 
architecture. Section 4 presents our proposed architecture 
and schemes, Section 5 deals with the analysis, 
comparison simulation results, and finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper stating the achievements from this 
work with future research directions. 
 
2. Related Work 
Most of the works regarding public key cryptography in 
wireless sensor networks are conducted to fit the low-
power characteristic of sensor nodes. Recently, several 
works like [5], [6], [7, [8] have addressed or successfully 
have implemented public key schemes with current 
generation sensors. Both from software and hardware 
perspectives, PKC schemes have shown reasonable 
performances. In this section, we discuss some of these 
exclusive research works and compare their contributions 
in this area. 
[4] presents the first known implementation of elliptic 
curve cryptography over F2p for sensor networks based on 
8-bit, 7.3828 MHz MICA2 mote. The results show that, 
public key based scheme is viable for the modern-era 
sensors. In [5], the authors have conducted a comparative 
energy analysis upon RSA and ECC based public key 
algorithms for wireless sensor networks. They have used a 
simplified version of SSL for mutual authentication and 
key exchange. For their experiments, they have used 
Berkley/Crossbow motes platform, specifically the 
MICA2dots [9]. With the outcomes of their experiments, 
we see that, contrary to the widely held beliefs, 
authentication and key exchange protocols using 
optimized software implementations of public key 
cryptography are very viable on small wireless devices. 
In [6], the authors have proposed C4W which is 
basically an identity based PKC infrastructure. They have 
shown that their identity based scheme consumes less 
energy as it is certificateless and thus it is efficient both in 
terms of computation and communication costs. The 
TinyPK system demonstrated in [10] shows that, a public-
key based protocol is feasible even for an extremely 
lightweight sensor network. TinyPK is a software-based 
implementation of public key system tested on UC 
Berkeley MICA2 motes. 
[7] has shown that special purpose ultra-low power 
hardware implementations of public key algorithms can be 
used on sensor nodes. The authors have shown that PKC 
tremendously simplifies the implementation of many 
typical security services and additionally reduces 
transmission power due to less protocol overhead. [7] also 
provides an in-depth comparison of three different PKC 
implementations (Rabin’s scheme, NtruEncrypt and 
Elliptic curve) particularly targeted at wireless sensor 
networks. 
A more recent work on hardware implementation of 
PKC is proposed for elliptic curve over binary extension 
fields in [8]. The authors have proposed a dedicated 
coprocessor for certain cryptographic operations. They 
have shown that a reasonable amount of power can be 
reserved in this case and thus improved performance could 
be achieved without degrading other performance 
parameters. Though the actual data path is 8 bits only, this 
specific purpose coprocessor can handle operands of even 
163 bits. 
Other than the above mentioned works, in [11], Du et al. 
have suggested sparing use of PKC due to its high power 
consuming characteristic and proposed the use of one-way 
hash function instead of certificate. Construction of 
Merkle tree forest from sensors’ public keys and selection 
of height of the tree are the basics of their scheme. They 
have compared their scheme with other popular PK 
schemes for sensor networks and plotted the results which 
show significant performances. 
A distributed and cooperative public key authentication 
is proposed in [12]. It is also a hash key based scheme. In 
this cooperative mechanism, each node stores a limited 
number of hashed keys for other nodes which help in the 
authentication procedure during public key operation. 
According to [12], this scheme is free from any 
cryptographic operation which is designed to be fit for the 
constrained resources of the sensors. 
[13] has looked at several additive homomorphic public 
key encryption schemes and their applicability to WSNs 
when implemented on computationally limited sensor 
devices. The authors in this work, have provided 
recommendations for selecting the most suitable public 
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key schemes based on the topologies and the scenarios of 
wireless sensor networks. 
Reviewing all these works, we are motivated to propose 
a public/asymmetric key based scheme for secure wireless 
sensor networks. We have considered the constrained 
resources of the sensors and have proposed an approach 
that shows considerable performance with the modern-era 
sensor node platform. The following section describes our 
proposed S-PkSec security scheme in detail.  
 
3. Preliminaries 
3.1. Network Model 
 
We assume that, the base station (BS) has enough 
processing power and energy to do the calculations for the 
sensors in the network. The base station is a trusted entity 
and cannot be compromised in any way. The BS also has 
sufficient storage capacity to support the network. The 
sensors deployed in the network have the computational, 
memory, communication and energy resources like the 
current generation of sensor nodes (e.g., MICA2 motes 
[9]). Once the sensors are deployed over the target area, 
they remain relatively static in their respective positions. 
 
3.2. Pseudoinverse matrix 
 
The pseudoinverse matrix or generalised inverse matrix 
[14], [15] has a very nice property that could be used for 
cryptographic operations. It is well known that, a 
nonsingular matrix over any field has a unique inverse. For 
a general matrix of dimension nk × , there might exist 
more than one generalized inverse. This is denoted by, 
=),( nkM {A: A is a nk ×  matrix}. Let, 
),( nkMA∈ . If there exists a matrix ),( knMB ∈  
such that, 
AABA =  and BBAB =  
then each of A and B is called a generalized inverse matrix 
(or pseudoinverse matrix) of the other. In this paper, we 
use the notation gA  to denote the generalized inverse 
matrix of A. We use pseudoinverse matrix for the key 
handshaking process in our security architecture. 
It should be noted that, AA gg =)( is not always true. 
The set of all possible pseudoinverse matrices of A is 
denoted by }{ gA , and |}{| gA is the cardinality of 
}{ gA . Then we have: 
Lemma 1: Let gA be a pseudoinverse matrix of A . 
Then, 
)()( ArankArank g =  
Lemma 2: Let ),( nkMA∈ with kArank =)( . If 
A can be written as ]0;[ 1AA = , where 1A is a 
kk × nonsingular matrix then, 
),(:{}{
1
1 kknMZ
Z
A
Ag −∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
−
is an arbitrary 
matrix}  
Proof: Let ),( knM
Z
X
B ∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= . It is then easy to 
verify that both AABA = and BBAB = hold if and 
only if 11
−= AX . 
 
4. Our Proposed Scheme (S-PkSec) 
In this section, we propose our scheme with two phases; 
key handshaking phase between a sensor node and the 
base station, and the encryption/decryption phase. 
  
4.1. Key Handshaking Phase  
 
Let in be a node in the network and S  be the base 
station or sink. To derive a shared secret key between the 
node in  and the base station, the following operations are 
performed: 
1. Node in  randomly generates a matrix X with 
dimension nm × and its psedoinverse matrix, gX . 
These matrices are kept secret in the node. 
2. in  calculates XX g and sends it to the base 
station S . 
3. In turn, S  randomly generates another matrix 
Y with dimension kn × , and finds out its pseudoinverse 
matrix gY . These matrices are also kept secret in the base 
station. 
4. S calculates XYX g  and gg XYYX . Then it sends 
the resultant matrices to in . 
5. Upon receiving the products of matrices from S , in  
calculates, ggg XYYXYYXX = and sends it back to the 
base station. 
6. Now, both the node in  and the base station S  can 
compute the common secret key. in  gets it by calculating 
XYXYXX g =)(  and the base station gets it by 
calculating XYYXYYg =)( . Both of these outcomes 
(XY) are the same matrix with dimension km× . 
  Basically, the key XY  is locally computed by the node 
and the base station. Our mechanism ensures that, the 
individually calculated keys are same and this common 
key is used for encrypting the messages in the network. 
Thus, key handshaking process ensures a secure and 
efficient way of deriving distinct secret key (shared with 
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the base station) for each node taking part in the wireless 
sensor network. The derived common key could be used 
for node to base station or base station to node secure 
communications. 
 
 
4.2. Encryption/Decryption Phase 
 
The main module in secure node to node 
communications is a central key generator (CKG) which is 
located at the base station. The CKG helps any node in the 
network to decrypt the received encrypted messages from 
other nodes. If a node in  wants to send message securely 
to another node jn , it uses the key that it has derived 
using the key handshaking process. Say for example, the 
encrypted message sent from in  to jn  is )(MEXY . 
Here, M is the message sent from the sender to the 
receiver. XYE  means the message is encrypted with the 
key XY  which is actually the shared secret key between 
the base station and the sender in . Upon receiving the 
encrypted message, jn  places its own identity and the 
identity of the sender to the CKG. In turn, CKG generates 
a decryption key and transmits it to jn  encrypting it with 
the secret shared key that it has with jn . As the CKG in 
the base station has prior knowledge about the shared 
secret key between in and itself, it uses that knowledge to 
generate the decryption key. Now, jn  first decrypts the 
encrypted message (i.e., containing the corresponding 
decryption key) with its shared key, finds out the 
decryption key and uses that key to decrypt the message 
sent from node in .  
 
Figure 1.  Encryption and decryption of message by two 
communicating nodes in the network in S-PkSec. 
Figure 1 shows the secure communication method 
between two nodes in the network. In the figure, XAYA is 
the shared secret key between ni and base station, XBYB is 
the shared secret key between nj and the base station, and 
Kd is the decryption key provided by the base station. 
5. Performance Evaluation 
5.1   Initial Analysis 
  In our scheme, any node is  sends the SBS an 
nn× matrix which is of 2n  bits. In turn, the SBS sends 
an kn× matrix and an nn× matrix. For this the total 
number of bits passed for the matrices is, 
)(2 knnnkn +=+ bits. Again, the node is  sends the 
SBS an nm ×  bits. So, total number of bits for the 
matrices transmitted for deriving the shared key in the 
whole key handshaking process is, 
                mnknnn +++ )(2  
                )( mknnn +++=  
                )2( mknn ++=  
   All the calculations here are linear and can be 
performed very easily. Moreover, our scheme is adequately 
secure as capturing the messages like XX g , XYX g ,  
gg XYYX , and gXYY  could not be in any way helpful to 
construct the locally computed secret shared key XY . 
5.2   Simulation 
  We have analyzed our asymmetric key-based scheme S-
PkSec in terms of energy cost, memory cost, security and 
scalability. In our simulation, we considered the 
specifications of Berkeley/Crossbow MICA2dot [9] motes. 
These motes are equipped with 8-bit ATmega128L 
microcontrollers with 4 MHz clock speed, 128 KB 
program memory and Chipcon CC1000 low-power 
wireless transceiver with 433-916 MHz frequency band. 
The major power consumers in this mote are the processor 
and the wireless transceiver. During the transmission and 
reception operations, the microcontroller is turned on 
alongside the wireless transceiver. 
  According to our calculations, the cost of transmission 
of one byte is 59.2 μJ while the reception operation takes 
about half of the transmission cost (28.6 μJ). The power to 
transmit 1 bit is equivalent to roughly 2090 clock cycles of 
execution of the microcontroller. In our case, we 
considered a packet size of 41 bytes (payload of 32 bytes, 
header 9 bytes). With an 8 byte preamble (source and 
destination address, packet length, packet ID, CRC and a 
control byte) for each packet we found that, to transmit 
one packet 49×  59.2 = 2.9008 mJ ≈ 2.9 mJ energy is 
required. Accordingly, the energy cost for receiving the 
same packet is 49 ×  28.6 = 1.4014 mJ ≈ 1.4 mJ. 
Considering the same packet size for all the network 
operations, to set up a shared secret key with the base 
station each node needs (two transmissions and one 
reception) ((2×2.9) +1.4) = 7.2 mJ of energy. This cost is 
one time cost as once the shared secret key is derived, it 
could be used for the entire lifetime of the network unless 
the key is exposed or the node quits the network. 
  For node to node communication, the sender needs one 
transmission (2.9 mJ) and the receiver needs two 
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receptions and one transmission (((2×1.4) +2.9) = 5.7 mJ). 
As a whole, the entire scheme could be well-afforded by 
the energy resources of the current generation sensor nodes.   
5.3   Comparison 
  We compare our S-PkSec with C4W [6] and the one 
proposed in [5], which use simplified version of SSL 
handshake. Considering the energy consumption for 
communications, our scheme stays in the middle of other 
two schemes (shown in Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Communication cost for our scheme and other PKC-
based schemes 
 
Communication Cost PKC-based 
Schemes Sender (ni) Receiver (nj) 
C4W 6.3 mJ 4.8 mJ 
Our Scheme 10.1 mJ 5.7 mJ 
SSSL 19.4 mJ 19.6 mJ 
 
  For supporting our scheme, for sender node (ni), the 
numbers of transmissions and receptions are 3 and 1 
respectively which take ((3 × 2.9) +1.4) = 10.1 mJ) of 
energy in total. In case of receiver node (nB), it is 5.7 mJ 
for 1 transmission and 2 receptions. Figure 3 shows a 
comparative graph in terms of communication cost among 
these schemes. 
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Figure 2.  Communication cost for different PKC-based 
schemes 
 
  Though considering the communication cost, C4W 
exhibits better cost effectiveness than our scheme and 
SSSL, it requires pre-storing of all parameters before 
deployment. This in fact causes memory exploitation 
which is not present in our scheme. So, in terms of 
memory usage our asymmetric key-based scheme is better 
and its communication cost is satisfactory. 
5.4   Further Comments  
  In encryption decryption phase two messages are 
transmitted over public channel. When the receiver node 
needs the decryption key to decrypt a message from a 
particular sender node, it requests the SBS for the 
corresponding decryption key. In return, CKG encrypts the 
decryption key with the shared secret key of the receiver 
node. As the shared secret key is not known to any other 
node in the network, the decryption key for that particular 
sender-receiver pair could not be exposed. Now, the 
problem arises if the shared secret key of a node in the 
network is somehow compromised. In such a case, the 
base station revokes the shared key and the key 
handshaking process is re-initiated for that particular node. 
If such a compromise happens, even in that case, only one 
node is affected in the network while all other nodes could 
properly operate with confidential message transmission. 
   As any node can get a corresponding decryption key 
from the CKG (base station) for any sender node in the 
network, any pair of nodes in the network could 
communicate between themselves maintaining the high 
level of security. As mentioned earlier, for base station to 
node communications or node to base station 
communications, the shared secret key derived from the 
handshaking process is used which takes very little 
computation and message transmission. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Works 
On constructing complete security architecture for 
wireless sensor networks, in this paper we have presented 
an efficient approach which uses the asymmetry of public 
key cryptosystem for secure communications in the 
network. Though we think, the use of public key 
embedded sensor network is still far from reality, some 
good applications related to public key based scheme [16] 
make us positively convinced. So, we became enthusiastic 
to propose some mechanisms and protocols by means of 
asymmetric cryptography.   
While comparing with other asymmetric key based 
scheme we only considered transmission cost. In future, 
we should consider the computation cost as well, because 
this is not trivial for regular and small size networks. 
Moreover, in order to obtain complete and accurate results 
we have to find a common unit of measurement among all 
those schemes. This will also allow us to set the optimum 
for fine comparison among them. In addition to this 
developing a complete mathematical model for our scheme 
is one of our future objectives. We should also consider 
the key management and key revocation technique of our 
scheme more details in the future. 
In our scheme, we have used different keys for 
encryption and decryption of the messages for node-to-
node communications. Our simulation results and analysis 
have shown a considerable level of security which is 
viable with the current generation sensor node platforms. 
Our PKC-based architecture does not require any central 
certificate authority and thus it is free from managing and 
verifying huge computations associated with certificates. 
In future, we will combine our work with other security 
mechanisms to construct large-scale security architecture 
for WSN. 
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